University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1981

Prologue
Donald M. Gillmor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Gillmor, Donald M., "Prologue" (1981). Minnesota Law Review. 1151.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1151

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Prologue
Donald M. Gillmor*
On May 28-29, 1981, academicians representing law, journalism, history, political science, philosophy, and library science
met at Spring Hill, west of Minneapolis, with lawyers, judges,
reporters, editors, and graduate students to mark the fiftieth
anniversary of the United States Supreme Court's landmark
ruling in Near v. Minnesota.1 Yale Law School professor Owen
Fiss said that the conference "was probably the best birthday
party a case ever had."
In Near, a state law for the first time was held to violate the
freedom of press clause of the United States Constitution by
imposing a prior restraint. Prior restraints, however, were not
forbidden absolutely by the Court's ruling, and it is in part the
"exceptions" of Near that make the case a crucial element in a
continuing dialogue on the meaning of the speech and press
guarantees of the first amendment.
The following papers were meant to be read prior to the
symposium so that at the conference a premium could be
placed on discourse. The result was a dialogue characterized
by many of the participants as the most intellectually stimulating they had ever experienced in such a setting. Much of the
credit for the ease and vitality of the conversation belongs to
Floyd Abrams, a distinguished first amendment advocate who
moderated the symposium. The entire conference was recorded so that the participants' remarks could accurately be reproduced here.
Paul L. Murphy, University of Minnesota historian, observed in discussing his paper, the first of the conference, that
Near was an important step in recasting the fourteenth amendment and redefining the term "liberty" in the due process
clause of that vital constitutional provision. Near had an important impact on the state police power and brought to a sig* Professor of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Minnesota. He was program committee chairman for the Near v. Minnesota 50th
Anniversary Symposium.

1. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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nificant new stage Louis Brandeis's long crusade for restating
the word liberty in terms of human rather than property rights.
It extended the incorporation theory launched by Justice Edward T. Sanford in Gitlow v. New York, 2 and in time it would
lead to the deregulation and decriminalization of expression,
belief, and association.
Murphy and a number of discussants saw in Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes's opinion for the Court reflections of the
thinking of a legal realist. Hughes asked what the consequences of a prior restraint would be, and how the Minnesota
public nuisance law3 would work. Legal realism itself may
have represented a "paradigm shift," said Murphy, a change in
the social climate, a climate now ready to accommodate
changes in legal values, concepts, and practices. The resulting
liberal tradition also may have been a legacy of that branch of
the Progressive movement which felt so strongly about its philosophy of free speech that it was willing to depart from a philosophy of judicial review that displayed a decided deference to
the will of the legislature and opposed substantive limitations
on its powers.
Symposium participants disagreed on what a 5-4 decision
affirming Near would have meant. Other state legislatures may
have followed Minnesota's lead; liberating economic and intellectual forces, however, rapidly gathering momentum in the
New Deal period, may have already outpaced such possibilities.
Jesse Choper of the University of California-Berkeley Law
School said that if the Court would have affirmed Near, there
might have been positive gain for feedom of speech and press.
5
The Court, in Fiske v. Kansas4 and in Stromberg v. California,
had already ruled in favor of freedom of speech; cases following
Near, therefore, might have been decided more directly on substantive first amendment grounds, that is on their merits, and
the Court might have come more quickly to its vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines, had Near been affirmed. Instead,
Choper added, the Court in Near relied on a procedural technique to resolve the case because it happened to involve an
injunction.
John Hart Ely of Harvard Law School also would have
placed the "paradigm shift" farther back in time. Ely was not
2.
3.
4.
5.

268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Act of Apr. 20, 1925, ch. 285, 1925 Minn. Laws 358.
274 U.S. 380 (1927).
283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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convinced that the Court of the 1920s was wedded to regulation
and the police power, nor was he certain that the Taft Court
would not have voted the same way in Near, given the stirring
rhetoric of freedom one finds in such cases as Lochner v. New
York,6 Coppage v. Kansas,7 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,8 and
Meyer v. Nebraska.9
Garry Wills, author, critic, and professor of history at
Northwestern University, presented the second paper of the
conference. Although Professor Wills's paper is not reproduced
in this issue of the Minnesota Law Review, the following
paragraphs briefly summarize his oral presentation.
Wills identified Near v. Minnesota issues at the time of the
Constitution's ratification. Why then, if the ban on prior restraints, or licensing, was almost an irrelevance, a matter settled by 1787, does it reemerge as an embattled right in 1931?
The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, Wills believes, were the
great derailer of the first amendment freedom dialogue in
America, and they revived the threat that the framers feared
most: legislative and executive restraint of free speech, legislative restraint meaning subsequent punishment for publication.
For Jefferson there had been a legacy of freedom in the people
at the time of the Constitution's passage. The Alien and Sedition Acts revoked it.
Jefferson's and Madison's criticisms of federal power, said
Wills, are not enough to explain why the "living" document
(the Constitution) refused to grow in the expected direction toward broader protection of liberties. For that, we must put the
blame where Jefferson's earlier theory put it--on lack of virtue
in the people, and particularly on the failure of slavery to die
away as Jefferson expected and hoped. Once our "great anomaly" had been removed by the Civil War, Wills noted, the extension of constitutional protections could finally occur. "Seen
in that light, Near v. Minnesota is not the belated escape from a
'legacy of suppression' left us from the ratifying period, but the
fulfillment of an implied pledge from that time."
Although prior restraints and injunctions were not tools of
repression at the time of the Revolution, Wills added,
Madison's concern in writing the Bill of Rights was to protect
citizen against citizen (mobs, majorities, and popularly elected
6. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
7. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
8.

268 U.S. 510 (1925).

9. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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assemblies)-the kind of nativism that had called for passage
of the Alien and Sedition Acts. Jefferson and Madison had experienced repression, especially in the terrible treatment of the
Loyalists by both mobs and popularly elected governments. It
was the responsibility of the Republic to protect dissent from
the intolerance of a factious majority. A theory of free speech
and press-both a priori the rights of citizenship-was implied,
if not fully articulated, by the framers.
Much of the discussion at this point focused on the
strengths and weaknesses of constitutional historian Leonard
Levy's theses.' 0 Levy, while validly arguing that the first
amendment was a product of political expediency rather than a
sign of any reasoned commitment to civil liberties, may be
wrong in suggesting that the framers were not even thinking
about the rights of expression. Press historian Dwight Teeter
of the University of Texas College of Communication believes
that Levy, while correct in many of his assumptions, undervalued the contribution of the press of the period, especially Philadelphia newspapers of the 1780s. Printers of those papers, in
speaking against seditious libel, at least for their own freedom
of expression, created a rhetoric of freedom that was to have
important consequences.
The participants agreed, consistent with Levy's theories,
that Jefferson did commit offenses against civil liberties during
his second term under a kind of McCarthyite fear of treason;
Jefferson sometimes saw the first amendment as a states'
rights instrument that gave the states power to control and
punish the press. Madison was very much alone in trying to
extend the reach of the first amendment and, in Wills's view,
was a more consistent and profound political thinker than Jefferson. Madison was interested primarily in freedom of religion, a multiplicity of religious sects, and following therefrom
myriad political factions.
Thomas Scanlon, a Princeton professor of philosophy, wondered what conceptual continuity there might be between present and past theories of freedom of expression. New
affirmative claims, such as access rights and confidentiality of
reporters' sources, may appeal to the same ideal of freedom of
expression. Since the means of reaching our goal of freedom of
discussion are always out of date and the threats to that goal
change, the goal might be stated in a way that goes beyond the
10.

L LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1963); L. LEVY, LEGACY OF
(1960).
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means. Is the goal embodied in the speech and press clause or
is the clause a list of means? Our aspirations may be different
than those of the framers.
Continuity for Madison, said Wills, was being open to new
issues. Speech would be an educational tool in support of a
more general republican ethos, and it would be a set of guidelines by which a free people would be encouraged to develop
freedom without being fixed to one procedure or another.
Michigan law professor Vincent Blasi, in an unusually comprehensive and original paper, searches for the elements of
prior restraint. In doing so, he begins the construction of a theory of prior restraint in which injunctions and licensing systems are linked to one another and to subsequent punishments
such as criminal prohibitions and civil liability rules. Five common attributes of these elements are identified and compared.
They are (1) self-censorship, (2) adjudications resulting in formal abstract decision making, (3) prohibitions that are invoked
and enforced too readily, (4) an unusual capacity to distort audience response, and (5) implicit premises that are antithetical
to the philosophy of limited government.
Near, says Blasi, represents a judgment more complex and
more historically grounded than any facile equation of injunctions with licensing systems would suggest. Furthermore, Justice Pierce Butler's dissent in Near never has been answered.
Why look for linkages between prototypic injunctions and
licensing systems? One reason, says Blasi, is historical, since a
fixed point in our constitutional tradition is the rejection of licensing systems, and insofar as you can connect licensing systems with injunctions, you mobilize the force of history against
injunctions. Secondly, individual decisions have a kind of gravitational force in subsequent constitutional analysis. Once in
place, a case like Near continues to exert its own vitality and
magnetism in the clustering of libertarian notions. Finally, a
general theory of prior restraint and the use of prototypes will
help us deal with other cases and other forms of prior restraint
in practical ways.
Blasi noted the argument of Professors Fissn and Stephen
Barnett 12 that the only reason for a presumption against injunctions is the presence of the collateral bar rule-the rule
that a person who violates an injunction, as well as a licensing
system, will not be able to raise first amendment defenses in
11. 0. Fss, THE CIVIL RiGHTs
12.

INJUNCTION (1978).
Barnett, The Puzzle of PriorRestraint, 29 STAN. I. REV. 539 (1977).
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the ensuing contempt action. Take away the collateral bar rule,
in other words, and there is no persuasive reason for disfavorig injunctions. Blasi disagrees and finds, absent the collateral
bar rule, sufficient argument to justify his analytical frame.
Partly responsible for the fading of the distinction between
prior restraints and subsequent punishments, said Blasi, is
Floyd Abrams's masterful brief in Landmark Communications
v. Virginia.13 With the Pentagon Papers case' 4 in mind,
Abrams wondered whether we want people to disobey court injunctions. Is it advisable, he asked, to have a body of law which
makes it easier for people to decide whether or not they should
obey an injunction? It may well be that a very important force
in protecting rights of expression, Blasi added, is inculcating a
mentality of challenge against government in the minds of citizens, a frame of mind so far undeveloped in the case of speech
injunctions. Injunctions, in Blasi's view, do represent an escalation of extraordinary legal command, a weapon that the government needs, but one that should be carefully rationed.
Erwin Knoll, editor of The Progressive, said that his decision to obey the injunction,' 5 which delayed publication of an
article on the "making" of a hydrogen bomb for more than six
months, was "the most serious moral error I've made in my
whole life." Knoll, however, would grant that the government
has a responsibility for keeping short term secrets in time of
war.
Knoll said that Near was invoked as a pretext for gagging
(a temporary restraining order and a prelimipublication
his
nary injunction). The national security exception assures an
emotionally charged climate in which no one will think rationally or constitutionally. 'There was a reason," Knoll added, "for
the first amendment to be written without exceptions of any
kind--even those no one would question."
Professor Blasi, nevertheless, was concerned that the ethic
of disobeying injunctions may cause government to escalate its
efforts toward social control and to use more extreme forms of
incapacitating speakers. He would avoid the totalitarian dynamic by obeying the court injunction. Professor Choper
agreed on the basis that legislatures, and not courts, are the enemy of free speech and that authorizing the issuance of an injunction, as in the film censorship case, Freedman v.
13. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
14. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
15. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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Maryland,'6 may cure the evil of a licensing system. Anthony
Lewis of the New York Times said that he would prefer subsequent punishments to the congenial and seductive prior
restraint.
In terms of first amendment values, both Lewis and Professor Fiss found it puzzling that Editor Knoll would be indifferent
to the question of access to government information, or what is
frequently referred to as the "public's right to know." While an
absolutist on the right to speak, Knoll believes the public's
right to know to be unenforceable through any legal mechanism. In addition, he fears that any criteria of responsibility or
respectability would undermine the first amendment. Floyd
Abrams agreed that the press could be required to vindicate a
public's right to know.
Professor Fiss contended that the first amendment, since it
has so much to do with the process of self-government, must
extend to the individual's passionate need to find out what is
going on-what Professor Scanlon would call "a right to learn."
Secrecy, Fiss added, is as much an affront to one's dignity as
someone telling you not to speak. For Lyle Denniston of the
Baltimore Sun, the first amendment is a regime of choice that
imports no obligation to speak but protects any desire to speak.
Special privileges for journalists seemed to Minnesota
political scientist Sam Krislov to be comparable to the Ayn
Rand theory of architecture: journalistic egoism loses sight of
any social purpose. Knoll would call that egoism the act of conscience in judging whether or not to publish, and he noted that
the suppression of information can have catastrophic
consequences.
"State courts," said Associate Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court, "treated the outcome of a revolution, and
a revolutionary assertion, as just another restatement of the
common law." He added that Near "stands as a warning
against a common tactic-the tactic of seeking assent to a principle by conceding limits on its reach that may sound obvious
in dicta but are not before the court.... In Supreme Court
opinions, however, such limiting dicta often will appear to be
necessary to the principle itself and later rise to overwhelm
it....
If the first amendment is understood to bar the enactment of certain kinds of laws, if it focuses first on denying government certain powers before focusing on anyone's individual
rights, then the crucial first amendment question is what kind
16. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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of laws government may not make, in the form of statutes, or
ordinances, or administrative rules, or executive or judicial orders, as a legal basis for adverse action against speech and
press."
Judge Linde invoked the ghosts of establishment publishers who wrote the Minnesota statute at issue in Near. Those
who do not care about respectability tempt the respectable
press to save its own first amendment status by disavowing
those who abuse the liberty of the press through their unspeakable publications. It would be better that they stand by an absolute principle.
Professor Choper wondered if Judge Linde would accept
precisely drawn statutes punishing or suppressing perjury, incitement to riot, false advertising, or advance information about
the devaluation of the dollar. And Minnesota law professor
Carl Auerbach noted in reference to the Near dissent, that the
first amendment was not intended to protect constitutionally
unprotected speech.
"If all speech were constitutionally protected," he said,
"there would not be a subsequent punishment doctrine any
more than there would be a prior restraint doctrine. When
prior restraints or injunctions are used, you cannot tell ahead
of time whether a particular publisher will publish protected or
unprotected speech. The assumption of the prior restraint doctrine is that there will be subsequent punishment to deter constitutionally unprotected speech."
Linde argued that perjury and other well established
crimes were not abolished by the freedom of press clause and
that laws may prohibit specified acts other than acts of publishing. As a judge, however, he would not wish to decide where to
put various kinds of expression on a spectrum of allowable and
punishable speech.
In summary, Moderator Abrams observed that Near made
it possible for Alexander Bickel and him to argue before the
United States Supreme Court in the Pentagon Papers case that
there were no prior restraints--even though there are, notably
the peculiar exception for national security. Abrams said that
he was very tempted, as an advocate, to characterize anything
having the vaguest semblance to a prior restraint as a prior restraint, since prior restraints are somewhat of a taboo. Moreover, if prior restraints are designed to preserve government
secrets, the cases that come to the Supreme Court suggest that
they have failed totally. Carefully drawn laws would be more
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effective, such as one that would make disclosure of CIA
agents' names illegal. Although it is easier for the government
to get a prior restraint than to make the decision to start a
criminal prosecution, said Abrams, the latter can be more effective for the government and less dangerous for the press because harm done by publication is seldom discernible. The
prior restraint doctrine, Abrams added, keeps judges from going down the wrong road.
Yale law professor Thomas Emerson was more pessimistic
than Abrams in that he was disappointed by the record since
1931. No concrete rule against prior restraints has ever been
fashioned by the courts, said Emerson, and almost every day a
judge somewhere orders a prior restraint.
The "public's right to know" and "chilling effects," Abrams
continued in summarizing, are phrases that advocates do not
use because judges do not like them. While granting that the
press does need certain privileges-for example, confidential
sources and ways of keeping police out of newsrooms-if it is to
be able to function as intended, Abrams rejects what he calls
Erwin Knoll's "promiscuous" defiance of court orders. "One
ought to pause a few seconds more before one says no to the
rule of law."
Professor Emerson believes the right to know is part of the
whole system of freedom of expression which involves affirmative social rights that cannot be separated from the right to
communicate, although those rights may be in a more formative stage. We need, he said, new rules to deal with a new
society.
Lyle Denniston was concerned about the amount of the
"public policy baggage" of the courts that the private commercial press has had to carry since 1964 and New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan.17 Ethics, he believes, have become subordinated to
law and to fundamental theories about how the communicative
process is to be regimented and regularized.
"Why don't we let government in its relationship with its
sovereign (the people) work out the question of a right to know
and leave us in the private communicative business out of it.
Let that be a public policy formulation between government
and its auditors .... I know of no other field in which the rapidity is matched in the articulation of constitutional theory as
it has been in the press area. And it has absorbed the whole
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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discourse within newsrooms and within schools of journalism
as to what the communicative experience is in a modern industralized society... We might have done better as a practical
matter had we proceeded into the modern era of investigative
reporting on a theory of self-help, do it on our own, and, in fact,
if we are confronted with libel lawsuits, privacy invasion lawsuits, subpoenas, administrative summonses, legal restraints,
then let's find ways to abide that or ... [reject] it and go to the

slammer."
Both Denniston and Abrams would trade back some of the
protection of Sullivan for what was lost in Herbert v. Lando,18 a
ruling permitting the plaintiff to probe the defendant's "state of
mind."
Dean Jerome Barron of George Washington University's
National Law Center disagreed, saying that Sullivan had
achieved for the citizen-critic of government a much more vigorous and robust debate, and that Herbert may not prove to be
a great tragedy any more than has the newsroom search case,
Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily.19
The symposium concluded on a similar and appropriate
note when journalist Anthony Lewis suggested that what made
Sullivan a great case was the fact that Justice William Brennan based his opinion for the Court on the theory that there
could be no seditious libel under the Constitution of the United
States; that, says Lewis, is the neglected feature of Near. Had
Sullivan been limited to that idea we might not have constitutionalized the newsroom.

18.
19.

441 U.S. 153 (1979).
436 U.S. 547 (1978).

